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Abstract 
We investigate how job demands and control contribute to the relationship between 
overeducation and job satisfaction, relying on panel data for Belgian young workers. Our 
results reveal a significant role of demands and control. At career start, overeducated workers 
have less control than adequately educated individuals with similar skills levels, but more 
control than adequately educated employees doing similar work. Moreover, their control 
increases faster over the career than that of both groups of adequately educated workers. 
Finally, demands have less adverse effects on satisfaction for high-skilled workers, 
irrespective of their match, while control moderates the negative satisfaction effect of 
overeducation. These results contribute to a better understanding why overeducation persists. 
Moreover, they are consistent with the hypothesis that employers hire overeducated workers 
because they require less monitoring and are more able to cope with demands, although more 
direct evidence on this is needed. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies for many countries indicate that a substantial part of workers are overeducated, i.e. 
they are employed in jobs with requirements below their educational level (Groot and 
Maassen van den Brink, 2000a). The relevance of this issue is illustrated by research showing 
that overeducated individuals earn less and are less satisfied with their job than adequately 
educated workers with a similar educational background (Hartog, 2000; Allen and Van der 
Velden, 2001). Moreover, overeducation can be a persistent problem for many individuals 
(Baert et al., 2013). These findings raise the question why job seekers accept and, in 
particular, stay in overeducation positions. Further, given the observed negative relationship 
between job satisfaction and turnover (Freeman, 1978) or productivity (Iaffaldano and 
Muchinsky, 1985), we may wonder why employers are prepared to hire overeducated workers 
and what the most efficient HR strategies are to counter these adverse effects. 
A straightforward answer to the question why workers accept and stay overeducated, are the 
existence of labour market imbalances in combination with labour market rigidities
1
. 
However, a basic level of overeducation is always observed across countries (Groot and 
Maassen van den Brink, 2000a), indicating that this is only part of the story. Another 
explanation, advanced by McGuinness and Sloane (2011), is based on a ‘compensating 
differentials’-argument. Could it be that some workers stay in jobs for which they are 
overeducated because these jobs have other good characteristics? Given the negative 
relationship between overeducation and job satisfaction, this explanation seems rather 
farfetched. Yet, there is also evidence that the job satisfaction penalty of overeducation 
diminishes with years of work experience (Verhaest and Omey, 2009). One possible 
explanation is  an increase in job quality over time, reducing one’s inclination to change jobs 
and making overeducation more persistent.  
While job quality can be measured in many ways (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2009), we focus 
on job demands and control. The Job Demand-Control (JDC) model (Karasek, 1979) is one of 
the most dominant and influential paradigms on job quality in labour psychology (Wang et 
al., 2014) and has gained influence within other disciplines such as economics (Green, 2006). 
According to this model, high job demands in combination with low decision latitude causes 
strain. Hence, if overeducation is associated with lower job demands and increasing control 
over one’s career, some might prefer to stay in these jobs rather than engaging in continued 
time-intensive job search. Since arguments can be advanced both pro and con the statement 
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that overeducation is associated with more control and less demands (see section 3), an 
empirical test is needed. 
Job demands and control may also explain why employers are prepared to hire overeducated 
workers. As stated by van der Meer and Wielers (1996), overeducated workers may require 
less supervision and monitoring. Besides, we will hypothesise in this paper that they are more 
able to cope with work and time pressure. The JDC model also delivers a framework to 
employers to enhance the well-being of their workers. Other studies showed that the well-
being consequences of overeducation cannot be compensated by a reasonable wage increase 
(Verhaest and Omey, 2009). More efficient might be to compensate overeducated workers 
with more control. This may be in particular a successful strategy if control not only has an 
independent effect on job satisfaction, but also moderates the negative impact of over-
education. That this is not unlikely is illustrated by Weststar (2009), who found that control 
has a negative influence on perceived overqualification. Similarly, Erdogan and Bauer (2009) 
found that empowerment moderates the negative effects of perceived overqualification on job 
satisfaction, intentions to remain and voluntary turnover.  
In this paper, we make a more explicit link between overeducation and the JDC model. In a 
first step, we investigate whether and how overeducation affects the level of demands and 
control workers experience in their jobs. Next, we examine to what extent these differences in 
demands and control affect their job satisfaction. Although the consideration of some of these 
issues is not new, evidence remains scant, is mostly indirect and typically focusses on just one 
of the JDC dimensions. Our analysis also differs in several other ways from studies that 
focussed on related issues. Firstly, by relying on data for Flemish young workers, we focus at 
the first years of the career, when fundamental career choices are made and career processes 
are not yet influenced by unobserved preceding career decisions and events. Secondly, the 
longitudinal character of the data allows investigating whether and how the results change 
over time. This may shed some light on the mechanisms behind the persistence of 
overeducation. Thirdly, we execute panel-data analyses to account for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. As Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) showed in the context of happiness 
research, not accounting for this heterogeneity may substantially bias the results. Also for our 
research, this may be important since, as extensively argued in the literature (McGuinness, 
2006), overeducated workers are likely to differ with respect to innate ability or preferences 
from adequately educated workers
2
. Fourthly, overeducated workers are compared with two 
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types of adequately educated workers: those with a similar educational background but 
employed at a higher job level (for simplicity named “their adequately educated former 
classmates” hereafter) and those employed in similar jobs but with a lower level of education 
( “their adequately educated colleagues”). From the employee’s perspective, particularly the 
first comparison is relevant as it assesses the consequences to accept a job below one’s level 
of education instead of one that matches the educational level. From the employer’s 
perspective, it is more relevant to know how overeducated workers differ from their 
adequately educated colleagues.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on overeducation and its 
consequences. Next, we focus on the JDC model and elaborate our hypotheses. Thereafter, we 
explain our methods and review our estimation results. We end with a discussion and 
conclude. 
2. Overeducation and its consequences 
A substantial amount of literature regarding overeducation (McGuinness, 2006) or related 
concepts such as overqualification or underemployment (Feldman and Turnley, 1995) exists. 
Many of these studies estimate the effects of overeducation on outcomes such as wages, job 
satisfaction or turnover, using a regression related to the following specification: 
( )                                     
With Y = an outcome, YEDUC = years of education, YREQ = years of required education, 
YOVER = years of overeducation, YUNDER = years of undereducation, X = a vector of 
control variables, and  = error term. Given that YEDUC≡YREQ-YOVER+YUNDER, equation 
(1) is not identifiable and therefore often reduced to: 
( )   (   )     (   )      (   )             
If Y = ln (wage), studies typically find a positive return to YOVER (     ) and YREQ 
(     ), and a negative return to YUNDER (     ) (Hartog, 2000). Moreover, both 
the return to overeducation and the penalty to undereducation are found to be lower than the 
return to required education.  
The evaluation of the extent to which overeducation has positive or negative wage effects 
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largely depends upon the comparison  made. Compared with their adequately educated 
colleagues (cf. equation (2)), overeducated workers are better off as they earn a return on their 
surplus years of education. However, they earn less than their adequately educated former 
classmates as the return to these surplus years is lower than the return to required years of 
education (    ). This last comparison can be illustrated by substituting YREQ instead of 
YEDUC into equation (1): 
( )   (   )      (   )      (   )            
Equations (2) and (3) are equivalent and only differ with respect to the interpretation of the 
coefficients for over- and undereducation. Essentially, equation (2) measures the effects of 
mismatches resulting from a change in YEDUC, whereas equation (3) measures the effect of 
mismatches resulting from a change in YREQ. Equation (2) is particularly relevant for 
employers as it assesses how much more overeducated workers are paid compared to adequa-
tely educated one’s doing the same type of job. Equation (3) is more informative for the 
worker as it assesses how much less they will be paid if they accept an overeducation position 
instead of one for which they would be adequately educated.  
Also regarding other outcomes such as job satisfaction or turnover, overeducated workers can 
be compared with these two types of adequately educated workers. As equation (2) makes 
clear, differences in well-being between overeducated workers and their adequately educated 
colleagues might emerge from two factors. First, there might be a pure mismatch effect ( ), 
resulting from skill underutilization or feelings of relative deprivation. Second, there might be 
a supplementary effect ( ) resulting from the fact that overeducated workers have, by 
definition, more education than their adequately educated colleagues. This supplementary 
effect will show up if there is a relationship between years of education and the outcome 
variable regardless of the match. Consider for instance that highly educated individuals have, 
on average, higher aspirations about all aspects of their jobs. To the extent that aspirations are 
not directly observed, education might serve as a reliable signal. Hence, from the perspective 
of the employer who has to decide on the hiring of an overeducated worker, this is an 
additional effect to be taken into account. Also differences in outcomes between overeducated 
workers and their adequately educated former classmates might emerge from both a direct 
mismatch effect and a supplementary effect (cf. Equation (3)). Here, the supplementary effect 
( ) results from the fact that overeducated workers are, by definition, employed at lower job 
levels.  
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With respect to job satisfaction, cross-sectional studies generally find that overeducated 
workers are less satisfied with their job than their adequately educated former classmates 
(Feldman and Turnley, 1995; Battu et al., 2000; Allen and van der Velden, 2001; McGuinness 
and Sloane, 2011). When comparing them with their adequately educated colleagues, there is 
less consensus. While Hersch (1991) and Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) noted that overeducated 
workers are also less satisfied in comparison with this alternative group of adequately 
educated workers, other studies did find no or mixed evidence for this comparison (King and 
Hautaluoma, 1987; Khan and Morrow, 1991; Tsang et al., 1991; Büchel, 2002). Further, 
Johnson and Johnson (2000) investigated the consequences of overqualification for postal 
workers relying on longitudinal data. They found indications of adaptation as perceived 
overqualification was not found to result in lower job satisfaction one year later. Also 
Verhaest and Omey (2009) found some evidence on limited adaptation, relying on panel data 
for young workers. Interestingly, they found a more pronounced effect of overeducation on 
job satisfaction once unobserved heterogeneity was accounted for
3
.  
For firms, job dissatisfaction may entail substantial costs if it results in more turnover and 
lower performance. There is cross-sectional evidence that overeducated workers have more 
quit intentions and engage more in on-the-job search than both types of adequately educated 
workers (e.g. Hersch, 1991; Tsang et al., 1991). The studies that investigated the relationship 
between overeducation and performance are scarcer. While King and Hautaluoma (1987) 
found no statistical difference in self-rated performance between overqualified and adequately 
qualified workers, Fine and Nevo (2008) noted a positive difference in supervisor-rated job 
performance. Also studies relying on employer surveys by Athey and Hautaluoma (1994) and 
Maynard et al. (2009) concluded that overqualified workers outperform their adequately-
qualified colleagues. Finally, relying on linked employer-employee panel data, Kampelmann 
and Rycx (2012) revealed a positive relationship between the average level of overeducation 
within firms and firm productivity. This suggests that the positive direct productivity effects 
resulting from the surplus of education more than outweigh the negative productivity effects 
resulting from job dissatisfaction.  
To conclude, overeducation clearly has negative consequences for the individual worker. Yet, 
the negative effects on job satisfaction seem to diminish over time. While this might be 
explained by adaptation, another explanation may be that overeducated workers face a job 
quality improvement in terms of characteristics that are not investigated insofar. From the 
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employers’ point of view, the picture is more nuanced. On the one hand, overeducated 
workers are paid higher wages and they are, at least early in their careers, less satisfied and 
more engaged in on-the-job search. On the other hand, they seem to perform better. Yet, 
hardly anything is known about what makes them to perform better. Moreover, there might be 
room for further productivity improvements to the extent that employers manage to minimise 
the adverse consequences of lower job satisfaction.  
3. Job demands, control and overeducation: theory and hypotheses 
The JDC-model (Karasek, 1979) offers an evident way to counter adverse consequences of 
overeducation. Karasek argues that a combination of job demands and control is essential for 
the development of strain and ‘activity’. Psychological job demands refer to stressors such as 
the combination of high working pace and high time pressure. Control refers to the possibi-
lities in deciding how to meet the job demands, and comprises two sub-dimensions: ‘decision 
authority’ and ‘skill discretion’. The strain hypothesis states that the most adverse reactions of 
psychological strain are in the high strain job, which combines high job demands with low job 
control. High demands initiate a state of arousal leading to damaging, residual strain when it 
cannot be converted into an effective coping response, due to a lack of discretion. The 
learning hypothesis (Karasek, 1979) states that an increase in problem solving activity will 
occur in so-called active jobs, with high job demands and high job control. The JDC model 
has been extensively tested and confirmed in empirical research, both relying on cross-
sectional data (de Lange et al., 2003) and on panel data (Verhofstadt et al., 2015).  
We investigate the intermediate role of control and demands for the effect of overeducation 
on job satisfaction. Given the conceptual interconnection between overeducation and skill dis-
cretion, we only focus on the decision authority subdimension of control. Further, since also 
cognitive demands and job complexity (and thus overeducation) are conceptually inter-
connected, we focus on quantitative demands for the dimension ‘psychological job demands’.  
Effects of overeducation on demands and control 
Several authors have already suggested that the level of autonomy is related to overeducation. 
According to van der Meer and Wielers (1996) and Chatterji et al. (2003), employers favour 
overeducated workers because they require less supervision and monitoring. They delivered 
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indirect evidence on this hypothesis by showing that overeducation is more prevalent in 
organisations with monitoring difficulties, such as big firms. Also survey results indicate that 
recruiters associate overeducated workers with lower supervision requirements (Athey and 
Hautaluoma, 1994). The literature remains unclear about whether these lower supervision 
requirements either result from a direct overeducation effect (γ>0) or from an overall negative 
relationship between education or abilities and monitoring costs (>0). Whatever the reason, 
the result will be that overeducated workers get more autonomy than their adequately 
educated colleagues (cf. Equation (2): γ+>0, when Y = control; Hypothesis 1).  
Whether overeducated workers also get more autonomy than their adequately educated former 
classmates partly depends on the relationship between autonomy and job complexity (cf. 
Equation (2)). Since higher level jobs are generally associated with more responsibilities and 
supervision tasks (Kristensen et al., 2002; Vanroelen et al., 2010), we expect this relationship 
to be positive (β>0). The direct overeducation effect and the job complexity effect thus may 
operate in opposite directions and, hence, it is not a-priori clear whether overeducation is 
beneficial or not from the individual’s point of view. Although the results by McGuinness and 
Sloane (2011) suggest that both effects more or less balance out, other evidence is lacking.  
The literature also delivers a few vantage points with respect to the impact of overeducation 
on quantitative demands. According to Bulmahn and Kräkel (2002), employers hire overedu-
cated workers because they are able to quickly offer improvisational solutions in times of 
crises (e.g. a production process break down). This need for quick solutions will be higher 
when firms have to operate under strict deadlines. Further, a number of studies have found 
that educational outcomes are related to time management skills (Claessens et al., 2007). 
Hence, higher educated individuals are likely to be, on average, more able to cope with 
workload. If so, it is rational for employers to assign more workload to higher educated indi-
viduals (>0). Both arguments imply that overeducated workers get more quantitative 
demands than their adequately educated colleagues (γ+>0 when Y = demand; Hypothesis 2).  
The difference in quantitative demands between overeducated workers and their adequately 
educated former classmates both depends on the direct overeducation effect (γ) and the effect 
resulting from the fact that overeducated workers occupy jobs at lower job levels (-β). Several 
studies have found that higher skill-level positions are active jobs (Kristensen et al., 2002; 
Vanroelen et al., 2010), implying more control but also more demands (β>0). Also here, the 
direct overeducation effect and the job complexity effect may operate in opposite directions, 
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making it not a-priori clear whether overeducated workers get more or less quantitative 
demands than their adequately educated classmates.  
Interaction effects between overeducation and demands or control on job satisfaction 
The type of adequately educated workers to which overeducated ones are compared is also 
relevant when assessing possible interaction effects between overeducation and other 
variables. Consider that X consists of a set of variables Z, and interaction effects between the 
educational and mismatch variables and a moderating variable M. Then, we get the following 
extensions for equations (2) and (3): 
(4)   (   )     (   )      (   )       (     )       
(     )        (     )              
(5)   (   )      (   )      (   )       (     )        
(     )        (     )              
The interaction effect between YOVER and M in equation (4), which compares workers 
occupying similar jobs, consists of the direct interaction effect (γm) and the interaction effect 
between years of education and M (m). In equation (5), however, the interaction effect 
consists of the difference between the direct interaction effect (γm) and the interaction effect 
with years of required education (βm). Hence, depending on the evaluated comparison, also 
different conclusions may be made regarding the interaction effect with M.  
The possible moderating role of autonomy for the impact of overeducation on well-being has 
already been suggested by several authors. Ritti (1970) suggested that feelings of underem-
ployment among engineers could be mitigated by giving them more control over work 
decisions . Put differently, giving more autonomy to formally overeducated workers might 
give them opportunities to craft their jobs and align them with their skills (cf. Wrzesniewski 
and Dutton, 2001). Similar arguments have been put forward by Khan and Morrow (1991) 
and Battu et al. (2000). Relying on cross-sectional data, a few studies also provided some 
indirect empirical evidence for these arguments. Weststar (2009) showed that technical and 
social control has a negative influence on perceived overqualification. Further, Erdogan and 
Bauer (2009) found that empowerment moderates the negative effects of perceived 
overqualification on job satisfaction  and voluntary turnover. According to the authors, it is 
the sense of deprivation among overqualified workers that is alleviated by more autonomy. 
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Both the skills utilisation and the relative deprivation argument suggest that autonomy 
moderates the direct effect of overeducation on well-being (γm>0 when Y = job satisfaction). 
Since the literature delivers few vantage points regarding eventual supplementary effects 
related to years of (required) education, we expect a positive interaction effect between 
overeducation and autonomy on the basis of both specification (4) and (5) (Hypotheses 3 and 
4 respectively). 
The possibility of an interaction effect between overeducation and demands has got less 
attention insofar. The JDC-model implicitly delivers a prediction regarding this relationship 
as skill discretion is defined as a subdimension of control. According to this model, skill 
discretion is a positive moderator for the negative effect of demands on job satisfaction. This 
process is directly related to discrepancies between attained and required education (γm<0), 
and not to overall levels of (required) education. Regarding the level of education, we expect 
a positive interaction effect with quantitative demands (m>0) if higher educated individuals 
are indeed more able to cope with workload and time pressure (cf. supra). Hence, as the direct 
overeducation interaction effect and the education interaction effect operate in opposite 
directions, it is not a-priori clear whether the impact of quantitative demands on job 
satisfaction is higher or lower for overeducated workers in comparison to their adequately 
educated colleagues.  
Further, following previous findings in the literature, we expect a positive interaction effect 
between quantitative demands and job complexity (βm>0). Ritti (1970), for instance, noted the 
highest job satisfaction levels among individuals working in jobs with both high time and 
intellectual demands. Vanroelen et al. (2010) found that the health-damaging effects of job 
demands are stronger in low occupational status positions. As both the direct overeducation 
interaction effect and the opposite job level interaction effect are expected to be negative, we 
expect that quantitative demands have stronger adverse effects on job satisfaction for 
overeducated workers than for their adequately educated former classmates (γm-βm<0; 
Hypothesis 5). 
4. Data and methodology 
Our analysis is based on the SONAR data regarding the early careers of Flemish young 
workers. These data originate from repeated surveys among two birth cohorts (born in 1976 
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and 1978 respectively), each consisting of about 3000 individuals. These respondents were 
selected through a representative multistage sampling and interviewed for the first time at age 
23. Follow-up surveys were conducted at age 26, with response rates of about 70%. Trained 
interviewers performed the oral interviews at the interviewees' home address.  
We investigate the situation at the start of the first job and the situation at the moment of the 
last interview (i.e. at age 26). The first job is defined as the first paid employment of at least 
one month. This job is observed for 5169 of the respondents. Given the longitudinal character 
of our study, we restrict the analysis to the 3694 individuals for which we also observe the 
situation at age 26. Exclusion of individuals with missing values further restricts the sample to 
3032 persons. Finally, we exclude a small number of people who realized an increase in their 
level of education between the first job and age 26, resulting in a final sample of 2864 
individuals. 
Estimation methods 
We estimate several model specifications in line with equations (2) and (3), with autonomy, 
quantitative demands and job satisfaction as dependent variables. To account for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, random- or fixed-effects models may be estimated. Hausman tests 
revealed that fixed-effects models should be preferred to standard random-effects models in 
this study
4
. However, fixed-effects models cannot identify time-invariant effects. Hence, as 
YEDUC remains constant for our sample, we cannot estimate equation (3) on the basis of this 
method. Moreover, as YREQ, YOVER and YUNDER are a perfect linear combination of 
YEDUC, also equation (2) cannot be estimated on the basis of this method
5
. Therefore, we opt 
for estimating correlated random effects models, as proposed by Mundlak (1978). Our 
approach consist in additionally including individual-mean values of all time-varying 
covariates. This allows to include variables with no variation within individuals, while at the 
same time accounting for correlation between the random effects and the time-variant 
regressors
6
. Given the aforementioned perfect linear combination, we are able to include 
mean values of only two (YOVER and YUNDER) of the three education variables. By doing 
so, we account for unobserved differences between overeducated workers and their 
adequately educated former classmates, which is important when evaluating the impact of 
overeducation from the individual’s perspective. However, we cannot account for unobserved 
differences across educational levels, which may contribute to differences in outcomes 
between overeducated workers and their adequately educated colleagues. Yet, to the extent 
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that individual heterogeneity that is unobservable to the researcher is also unobservable to the 
employer, this should not be problematic. After all, it doesn’t matter for employers whether 
differences in behaviour between overeducated and their adequately educated colleagues 
result from differences in education or in unobservable factors
7
.  
Variable measurement 
The measurement of YEDUC is based on the normal study length of the equivalent 
educational level. Five educational categories are distinguished: less than lower secondary (6 
years of education), lower secondary (10 years), higher secondary (12 years), lower tertiary 
(15 years), and higher tertiary (16 years). For the measurement of YREQ, we rely on job 
analysis using the Standard Classification of Occupations of Statistics Netherlands (CBS). 
This detailed classification is based on five-digit codes and five job levels. The educational 
requirements of the job levels correspond to the five educational levels that were 
distinguished for the measurement of YEDUC. YOVER is computed by the difference between 
YEDUC and YREQ for overeducated workers and set to zero for other workers. A parallel 
measurement procedure is applied for YUNDER. The CBS measure has frequently been used 
in the literature (e.g. Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000b) and performed well in vali-
dation studies (e.g. van der Meer, 2006). A major advantage of using job analysis is avoiding 
the problem of reversed causality resulting from the influence of control on overeducation 
perceptions (cf. Weststar, 2009). While it may be argued that above all perceived 
overeducation influence job satisfaction, our results can be interpreted as being estimates of a 
reduced-form model, whereby objective overeducation influences perceived overeducation. 
The measurement of demands and control are based on a list of items about different job 
characteristics
8
. Respondents rated these items on a 4-point scale, ranging from “completely 
disagree” to “completely agree”. For job demands, we could only use one item, (whether one 
had to work at a great pace or under time pressure), related to the quantitative aspects of 
demands (QDEMAND). To measure control, we used an average of three items (AUTON): 
were the workers able to decide (a) what to do on a particular day, (b) how much work they 
had to perform that day and (c) how to perform the job. Their internal consistency, measured 
by Cronbach’s alpha, is 0.863. To facilitate interpretation, we rescaled both QDEMAND and 
AUTON to a range from 0 to 1. For the measurement of job satisfaction at the career start, we 
rely on the question: “During the early phase of your first job, how satisfied were you with 
your job?” A similar question measures satisfaction at age 26. Each time, respondents had to 
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answer on a five-point Likert scale. 
In the job satisfaction analysis, we account for three possible compensations for over-
education (wages, autonomy and quantitative demands). Wages are measured by the natural 
logarithm of real hourly net wages (LNWAGE)
9
. To account for the heterogeneous 
composition of our sample, we include several control variables such as age, the percentage of 
employment (full time=100%) and dummy variables for firm size, sector of employment, 
public sector, gender, non-Belgian nationality and living together. Further, we control for 
some variables that are related to the structure of the data: dummies for the cohort (1976 or 
1978), the type of observation (start first job or age of 26) and the type of job (first job or 
other job). Experience (YEXP) and its square are also included in every specification. Finally, 
in some specifications, we include interaction terms between the educational variables and 
experience to account for eventual changes in effects over time. Table 1 reports descriptive 
statistics on the main variables. In general, job quality improves over the career. At age 26, 
we observe less overeducation, higher wages, higher levels of reported autonomy and higher 
job satisfaction. Yet, individuals also report higher levels of demands and are more often 
undereducated for their job. 
‘Table 1’ 
5. Estimation results 
We analyse the determinants of autonomy, quantitative demands and job satisfaction. In a 
first specification, we only account for main effects of the educational and mismatch 
variables. In specification two, we add interactions between these variables and experience. 
For job satisfaction, model 3 adds wages and JDC dimensions as possible compensation 
variables. Finally, model 4 also includes interactions between the JDC dimensions and the 
education and mismatch variables. 
Autonomy and quantitative demands 
Table 2 indicates that adequately educated workers get more autonomy when years of 
required education are higher. At the start of their career (YEXP=0), overeducated workers get 
less autonomy than their adequately educated former class mates (model with YEDUC 
included). Compared to their adequately educated colleagues, however, overeducated workers 
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get more autonomy (cf. Hypothesis 1). As overeducated workers get more experienced, the 
negative difference in autonomy compared to their adequately educated former classmates 
decreases. A simulation suggests that the gap between the overeducated and their former 
classmates is vanished after about 14 years (-0.0195/0.0014). 
Also for quantitative demands, adequately educated workers experience more of it in jobs 
requiring more education. Overeducated workers have less quantitative demands than their 
adequately educated former class mates (model (1), with YEDUC included). Further, our 
results do not indicate that, at the start of the career (YEXP=0), the quantitative demands of 
overeducated workers differ from those of their adequately educated colleagues (model with 
YREQ included). However, we find evidence on a positive interaction effect between YOVER 
and YEXP. Hence, a positive gap in quantitative demands seems to emerge over time between 
overeducated workers and their adequately educated colleagues (cf. Hypothesis 2). 
Nevertheless, since there is also a positive interaction effect between YREQ and YEXP, their 
quantitative demands always remain lower than the demands they would have in a job that fits 
their education.  
‘Table 2’ 
Job satisfaction 
Based on the specification without compensation variables (Model 1), we find that, at least 
during the early career, overeducated workers are less satisfied with their job in comparison to 
both types of adequately educated workers (Table 3). Further, we find these gaps to diminish 
with years of experience (Model 2). Simulations suggest that the job satisfaction gaps with 
both types of adequately educated workers are closed after about ten to eleven years. 
‘Table 3’ 
Model 3 includes wages and the JDC dimensions as compensation mechanisms. The results 
on the JDC dimensions confirm the strain hypothesis of the JDC model; a positive effect of 
autonomy and a negative effect of time pressure on job satisfaction. Also the interaction effect 
is statistically significant. The absolute value of the overeducation coefficient decreases with 
about one fifth in value in the model that controls for YEDUC (from -0.112 to -0.092). This is 
due to the fact that, at the career start, overeducated workers earn less
10
 and have less 
autonomy than their adequately educated former classmates. In the specification that controls 
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for YREQ, the coefficient increases with about one fourth (from -0.121 to -0.155). This results 
from higher wages and higher levels of autonomy in comparison to adequately educated 
colleagues at the start of their careers. Also the positive interaction effects between over-
education and years of experience drop slightly since overeducated workers get more 
autonomy as their experience grows. Nevertheless, these interaction effects remain largely 
statistically significant. 
Model 4 investigates possible interaction effects between the education variables and autono-
my and quantitative demands. In line with Hypothesis 3 and 4, autonomy positively 
moderates the job satisfaction difference between overeducated and both types of adequately 
educated workers
11
. Opposed to Hypothesis 5, we have no indications that quantitative 
demands have stronger adverse effects on job satisfaction for overeducated workers than for 
adequately educated workers with a similar educational background. Finally, we find a 
positive interaction effect between overeducation and quantitative demands in the model that 
controls for YREQ.  
Given that the impact of autonomy and quantitative demands on job satisfaction depends on 
the match status of individuals, we provide some effect size estimates for alternative types of 
workers. We computed the effect size of changing from a passive job (i.e. a combination of 
low demands and low control) to an active job (i.e. combination of high demands and high 
control)
12
 for three types of workers: overeducated workers with a lower tertiary degree 
(YEDUC=15) and working in jobs that require a higher secondary degree (YREQ=12), and for 
their adequately educated counterparts. Activating passive jobs has by far the largest job 
satisfaction impact for overeducated workers: their job satisfaction increases by 0.988 
compared to an increase of 0.335 for their adequately educated former classmates and an 
increase of 0.645 for their adequately educated colleagues. Decomposition of this effect 
shows that this is explained both by a higher impact of autonomy and a less negative impact 
of quantitative demands.  
6. Discussion and conclusions 
Our results deliver several insights into the relationship between overeducation and job 
satisfaction, and the intermediate role of autonomy and quantitative demands. First, we found 
that overeducated workers have more autonomy than their adequately educated colleagues but 
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less than their adequately educated former classmates. This resembles the findings regarding 
overeducation and earnings (see Hartog, 2000). We also found that being employed in a job 
for which one is overeducated is associated with less perceived quantitative demands. Few 
other studies have already found that overeducation may also have positive consequences if 
assessed from the individual’s point of view. On the contrary, apart from lower earnings and 
job satisfaction, also other negative consequences have been detected such as lower training 
participation (e.g. Hersch, 1991). Compared to their adequately educated colleagues however, 
overeducated workers seem to perceive higher levels of quantitative demands once they get 
more experienced. 
The finding that autonomy is a positive moderator for the impact of overeducation on job 
satisfaction is in line with previous conclusions of Erdogan and Bauer (2009) and Weststar 
(2009). Our contribution is that we relied on panel data, allowing to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, and that we measured overeducation in a more objective way, thus avoiding 
the problem of reversed causality. Further, we showed that this moderation effect exists both 
from the individual’s and the firm’s perspective. This, in combination with the finding that 
there was no interaction effect between autonomy and years of (required) education suggests 
that autonomy moderates the pure mismatch effect of overeducation. Potential explanations 
are that autonomy provides formally overeducated workers with more opportunities to utilize 
their skills (Ritti, 1970) or that autonomy alleviates the sense of deprivation among 
overeducated workers (Erdogan and Bauer, 2009). Finally, we found that quantitative 
demands have less adverse consequences for higher educated workers, whatever the quality of 
their match. This is in line with our supposition that higher educated and higher skilled 
workers are more able to cope with workload.  
Implications 
Our results provide some answers on the questions raised in the introduction. With respect to 
the question why labour market entrants accept positions for which they are overeducated, we 
find no indications that there is some compensation mechanism at the start of the career. 
Inexperienced overeducated workers seem to be compensated with less quantitative demands, 
but this effect is largely overruled by the lower level of autonomy that is associated with 
overeducation. Also for more experienced young workers, we find no indications that there is 
compensation. While autonomy increases faster over the career in the case of overeducation 
than in the case of adequate employment, our results suggest that it takes more than ten years 
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to close the initial autonomy gap. Hence, while this growth in autonomy may decrease their 
quit intentions, and thus may explain why young workers remain overeducated, it cannot be 
the full story. It thus seems that overeducation is mainly involuntary during the first years on 
the labour market, probably because of labour market rigidities. An additional mechanism that 
may explain why overeducation persists is adaptation. While the job satisfaction effect of 
overeducation remains negative, it clearly diminishes with experience, even if we filter out the 
effect of increasing levels of autonomy.  
Our results also suggest some answers on the question why employers are prepared to hire 
overeducated individuals. While their lower job satisfaction might have adverse productivity 
consequences, there might also be some advantages. First, we found that these workers, which 
are more highly educated, experience less adverse effects from quantitative demands. Further, 
the finding that overeducated workers get more autonomy than their colleagues is consistent 
with the proposition of van der Meer and Wielers (1996) and Chatterji et al. (2003) that these 
workers require less monitoring and supervision. These advantages may compensate or even 
overrule the negative productivity effects resulting from their lower job satisfaction in 
comparison to adequately educated workers. Finally, the analysis also provides clear 
guidelines for employers to avoid any remaining negative consequences for productivity. A 
first best solution would of course be to provide adequate positions. However, as our results 
showed, activating their jobs seems to be a good second best.  
Directions for further research 
Several avenues for further research can be identified. First, while our results suggest that the 
autonomy and job satisfaction effect of overeducation decreases with experience, it remains 
unclear whether these effects completely disappear. Hence, it might be interesting to look 
beyond the first ten years on the labour market. Second, we only focussed on wages, demands 
and control as potential compensation mechanisms. However, many other factors, inside or 
outside the job, might work as compensators for overeducation (cf. McGuinness and Sloane, 
2011). Third, also the role of more underlying mechanisms in this context, such as job craf-
ting, deserves more attention. This may not only add to our understanding about how control 
moderates the impact of overeducation on worker well-being, it may also add to our 
knowledge about the extent to which organizations and labour markets are able to absorb 
initial surpluses of skills. Finally, also studies relying on data for other countries and regions 
would be welcome.  
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Notes 
1
 For extended discussions on the reasons why overeducation may emerge, see McGuinness 
(2006). 
2
 Overeducated individuals may, for instance, be less able if subsidization incentivizes less 
able people to invest more in educational signals than socially optimal. 
3
 A potential explanation may be that overeducated workers have on average lower 
aspirations, resulting in on average higher baseline job satisfaction levels.  
4
 The null hypothesis that the coefficients are not systematically different was always rejected 
(p<0.01). 
5
 One option may be to include those who changed educational levels in our sample. 
However, this group is very small and can be considered to be highly selective. 
6
 The estimated coefficients of the time-varying variables and their standard errors are 
equivalent to those on the basis of a first-differencing or fixed-effects estimation approach 
since we only have two observation periods.  
7
 We also estimated standard random-effects models. While the sizes of the coefficients and 
their statistical significance were sometimes different, overall conclusions were largely 
similar (results available upon request). 
8
 All survey questions and measurements regarding the first time period apply to the early 
phase of the first job. 
9
 While exact wages were reported for most individuals, we have information in intervals for 
one survey (cohort 76 at age 23) and for those who refused to report exact wages. In that case, 
we rely on interval midpoints. Observation with extreme values, defined as more than two 
standard deviations above or below the mean LNWAGE, are excluded.  
10
 Estimates on the earnings equation, relying on the data used in this paper, confirmed the 
findings in the literature (results available upon request). 
11
 Although the main effect of AUTON is statistically insignificant in model 4, this does not 
imply that autonomy has no effect for other than overeducated workers since all workers have 
at least 6 years of education. Additional F tests reveal that the impact of autonomy is 
statistically significant (p<0.01) in the case of adequate employment for all but the least-
educated in our sample (YEDUC=6).  
12
 Simulations are for minimum or maximum levels of autonomy and quantitative demands 
(i.e. values 0 or 1).  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Start First job Job at age 26 
YEDUC 13.388 (2.239) 13.388 (2.239) 
YREQ 11.895 (2.965) 12.470 (2.705) 
YOVER 1.679 (2.100) 1.186 (1.738) 
YUNDER 0.185 (0.788) 0.268 (0.927) 
YEXP 0.000 (0.000) 4.643 (1.963) 
LNWAGE 1.950 (0.212) 2.057 (0.191) 
AUTON 0.421 (0.288) 0.541 (0.273) 
QDEMAND 0.556 (0.317) 0.624 (0.303) 
JOB SATISFACTION 3.840 (1.045) 4.093 (0.769) 
DATA source: SONAR, own calculations; Number of individuals =2864. 
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Table 2: Autonomy and Quantitative Demands – Random effects linear regression coefficients and standard errors (Mundlak correction) 
 
Autonomy Quanititative Demands 
Model 
Specification 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
YEDUC included YREQ included YEDUC included YREQ included YEDUC included YREQ included YEDUC included YREQ included 
YEDUC 0.039 *** (.003)    0.046 *** (.006)    0.015 *** (.003)    0.021 *** (.008)    
YREQ    0.039 *** (.003)    0.046 *** (.007)    0.015 *** (.003)    0.021 *** (.008) 
YOVER -0.017 *** (.003) 0.022 *** (.004) -0.020 *** (.003) 0.026 *** (.007) -0.009 ** (.004) 0.005  (.005) -0.007 * (.004) 0.014  (.009) 
YUNDER 0.024 *** (.007) -0.015 * (.008) 0.028 *** (.009) -0.018  (.011) 0.006  (.009) -0.009  (.010) -0.015  (.011) -0.036 *** (.014) 
YEDUC*YEXP       0.000  (.001)          0.004 *** (.001)    
YREQ*YEXP          0.000  (.001)          0.004 *** (.001) 
YOVER*YEXP       0.001 ** (.001) 0.001  (.001)       -0.001  (.001) 0.003 ** (.001) 
YUNDER*YEXP       -0.001  (.002) -0.001  (.001)       0.006 *** (.002) 0.002  (.002) 
Overall R² 0.222 0.223 0.068 0.072 
Variables: YEDUC = years of education; YREQ = years of required education; YOVER = years of overeducation; YUNDER = years of undereducation; YEXP = years of experience; standard errors in 
parentheses; *: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01; Also included but not reported: intercept, experience, experience squared, percentage of employment, age, dummies for gender (1), non-Belgian 
nationality (1), cohort (1), living together (1), firm size (4), sector of employment (12), public sector (1), observation at age 26 (1), job change (1), and Mundlak correction terms; Number of observations = 
5728; number of individuals =2864. 
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Table 3: Job satisfaction - Random effects linear regression coefficients and standard errors (Mundlak correction) 
Model Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
YEDUC included YREQ included YEDUC included YREQ included YEDUC included YREQ included YEDUC included YREQ included 
YEDUC 0.022 ** (.010)    -0.009  (.021)    -0.063 *** (.021)    -0.109 *** (.031)    
YREQ    0.022 ** (.010)    -0.009  (.021)    -0.063 *** (.021)    -0.109 *** (.031) 
YOVER -0.092 *** (.011) -0.070 *** (.015) -0.112 *** (.012) -0.121 *** (.024) -0.092 *** (.012) -0.155 *** (.024) -0.129 *** (.022) -0.238 *** (.038) 
YUNDER 0.037  (.027) 0.015  (.029) 0.024  (.034) 0.033  (.040) -0.011  (.032) 0.052  (.039) -0.005  (.061) 0.103  (.069) 
YEDUC*YEXP       0.000  (.003)    -0.000  (.003)    -0.001  (.003)    
YREQ*YEXP          0.000  (.003)    -0.000  (.003)    -0.001  (.003) 
YOVER*YEXP       0.011 *** (.003) 0.011 *** (.004) 0.010 *** (.003) 0.009 ** (.004) 0.007 *** (.003) 0.006  (.004) 
YUNDER*YEXP       0.006  (.006) 0.006  (.005) 0.007  (.005) 0.007  (.005) 0.007  (.006) 0.009 * (.005) 
LNWAGE             0.372 *** (.094) 0.372 *** (.094) 0.380 *** (.094) 0.380 *** (.094) 
AUTON             0.717 *** (.113) 0.717 *** (.113) 0.030  (.437) 0.030  (.437) 
QDEMAND             -0.420 *** (.090) -0.420 *** (.090) -1.206 *** (.333) -1.206 *** (.333) 
AUTON*QDEMAND             0.331 ** (.158) 0.331 ** (.158) 0.272  (.169) 0.272  (.169) 
YEDUC*AUTON                   0.042  (.032)    
YREQ*AUTON                      0.042  (.032) 
YOVER*AUTON                   0.102 *** (.031) 0.144 *** (.044) 
YUNDER*AUTON                   -0.009  (.074) -0.051  (.069) 
YEDUC*QDEMAND                   0.061 ** (.026)    
YREQ*QDEMAND                      0.061 ** (.026) 
YOVER*QDEMAND                   0.012  (.026) 0.074 ** (.035) 
YUNDER*QDEMAND                   0.001  (.065) -0.060  (.060) 
Overall R² 0.128 0.133 0.209 0.218 
Variables: YEDUC = years of education; YREQ = years of required education; YOVER = years of overeducation; YUNDER = years of undereducation; YEXP = years of experience.*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; 
***: p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses; also included but not reported: see table 2; Number of observations = 5728; number of individuals =2864. 
